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INTRODUCTION
Despite the potential for mutual gains, the relationship between foreign investors and host
governments is characterized by divergent interests resulting from the distributional process
through which the policymaking apparatus allocates the costs and rewards of investment among
various interest groups. While investors are interested in maximizing returns, governments have
more complex preferences shaped by multiple interest-group pressures. Thus, the interaction of
investors and governments throughout the investment cycle—i.e., from negotiation to investment
to operation—is a protracted one in which a variety of contingencies and interest group reactions
may undermine investors’ initial assumptions and calculations.
The bargaining power perspective has produced an impressive body of theory and
evidence on investor-government interaction (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Fagre and Wells,
1982; Kobrin, 1987; Poynter, 1985; Svejnar and Smith, 1984), but has several limitations as well
(Haggard, 1990). In particular, the literature has not yet met the challenge posed by Kobrin
(1979) to identify “which events matter” and how “environmental processes affect investor
perceptions,” toward which end he calls for “…better definitions of the phenomena, a conceptual
structure relating politics to the firm and a great deal of information about the impact of the
political environment.” In this paper, we draw upon neoinstitutional theories to generate
propositions regarding the processes that trigger government attempts to overturn, alter or
reinterpret bargains made with foreign investors, as well as the country-level institutional
structures and organization-level characteristics that moderate pressures for change.
Bargaining Power and Commitment
The central insight of the traditional bargaining power perspective is that the balance of
“resources controlled by one party and demanded by the other” (Kobrin, 1987: 617) influences
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the division of profits between investors and the government. Investor bargaining power is
posited to be at a maximum prior to investment, when the government needs access to scarce
capital or technology, and then decline secularly once an investor sinks capital in the ground or
its technology or expertise diffuses (Poynter, 1985; Vernon, 1977). As its bargaining power
declines, an investor faces increased political risk as a result of the government’s incentive to
redirect its returns to a broader set of interest groups (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987;
LeCraw, 1984; Svejnar and Smith, 1984).
The canonical bargaining model can be expanded by characterizing the relationship
between foreign investors and host country governments as a repeated game in which formal
commitment devices or reputation moderate the pressure for secular decline (Janeba, 2001a, b).
Under this view, the central problem is analogous to the well-known “time consistency” problem
in the government’s choice of capital taxation: in order to induce investment, the government
may pledge low tax rates to investors, but such pledges are not credible because the government
has an incentive to redistribute investor returns once the investors sink capital in the ground
(Fischer, 1980; Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The literature on time consistency in monetary
policy (Auernheimer, 1974; Barro, 1983; Fischer, 1977) is also relevant in this connection. These
literatures suggest that “institutions” such as constitutional limits on retroactive taxation and
independent central banks bolster the credibility of government commitments, thereby mitigating
the time consistency problem and promoting capital investment.
Institutions: Established and Emergent
Structures intended to bolster credibility also play a critical role in securing new foreign
investment, especially when the sector in question is “politically salient” as a result of economic,
political, historical or cultural attributes that create a widespread public interest in its operation
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or outcomes. Combined with large sunk costs and long payback periods, political salience
creates the potential for conflict between investors and political actors, as the latter may face an
ex post incentive to overturn a bargain or alter or reinterpret its terms in response to constituent
pressures. Specific examples of credibility-enhancing formal structures that may be adopted in
this case include a series of bilateral contracts between investors and the government, legally
sanctioned market rules, and specialized administrative bodies charged with interpretation and
enforcement.
Formal structures such as these do not, however, generate credibility by sheer virtue of
their existence. The economic literatures described above, including the bargaining power
literature, either take for granted “institutional” status and assume that it generates credibility, or
attribute credibility to the status quo bias that characterizes a formal legislative construction as a
result of the political transaction costs of changing it (Dixit, 1996; McNollGast, 1989; Tsebelis,
2003)—i.e., overturning it, altering it or reinterpreting it. While we explicitly address the role
and sources of such transaction costs below, we highlight two additional sources of stability that
influence the probability that change will appear on the policymaking agenda in the first place,
and thus antecede political transaction costs as a source of credibility: (1) a bargain’s attainment
of legitimacy, defined as “the generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values,
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574); and (2) the extent to which entrenched interests
reinforce bargains from which they benefit.
Both of these potential sources of stability are especially germane to new foreign
investment because they accrue to a formal structure only with the passage of time; however,
structures adopted to govern new foreign investment are themselves often newly constructed.

5

William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589

Indeed, according to the neoinstitutional perspective in organization theory, an institution’s
primary source of stability is legitimacy attained on “cognitive” (Suchman, 1995: 579-81)
grounds, that is, based on widespread, implicit acceptance resulting from the long-term process
of “institutionalization” (Zucker, 1987).
In order to distinguish the newly-created formal structures that we consider in this paper
from those that have attained cognitively-based legitimacy, we refer to the former as “emergent
institutions” and the latter as “established institutions” (simply “institutions” in common
neoinstitutional parlance). This distinction does not imply that emergent institutions are
necessarily illegitimate. Rather, the critical contrast is that, while the outcomes generated by an
established institution are largely beyond normative evaluation as a result of the established
institution’s “taken-for-grantedness,” the outcomes generated by an emergent institution are still
subject to evaluation, which—if positive—may provide a “moral” basis for an emergent
institution’s attainment of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 579-81).1 Consequently, whereas all
investors face the risk that “politics or political players will have a negative impact on [their]
firm’s asset values, costs or revenues” (Wilkin, 2000), those whose “bargains” are governed by
an emergent institution face heightened political risk.
A Neoinstitutional Model of the Policymaking Process
The traditional bargaining power perspective depicts an investor’s level of political risk
as a deterministic outcome of bargaining between the investor and a monolithic government. We
expand this perspective by using various elements of neoinstitutional theory in economics,
political science and sociology to explicate the mechanisms that generate political risk over the
course of an investment’s lifecycle. These mechanisms operate through the policymaking
process, wherein interest groups that vary in their level of organization (Denzau and Munger,
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1986; Lowi, 1969; Olson, 1965; Wilson, 1980) attempt to influence political actors seeking to
retain office (Kingdon, 1984; Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991) within the constraints imposed by a
formal policymaking structure (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1980; McNollGast, 1987; Tsebelis, 2003;
Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1981). The main agents of
change in an emergent institution are the organized interest groups (Becker, 1983; Olson, 1965;
Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1975) that are most dissatisfied with how it accommodates their
interests (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Sjöstrand, 1995).
Although there are multiple potential sources of misalignment between “an institutional
arrangement… [and] the interests and needs of its participants,” (Seo and Creed, 2002: 232), we
focus on the common case of organized interest groups that perceive themselves to be
disadvantaged by the distributional consequences of an emergent institution.
In contrast to the rational choice orientation that often characterizes interest group models
of policymaking, we emphasize the effects of cognitive limitations and social influences on the
policymaking process. The strategies that organized interest groups pursue to instigate change in
emergent institutions reflect both political actors’ ability to consider only a limited range of
issues (Kingdon, 1984)2 and constituents’ reliance on heuristics and pre-existing beliefs and
biases (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; McFarland, 1991;
Zajac, 1995) to process the limited information available to them. Because the organized interest
groups seeking change are often insufficiently powerful on their own to move the issue of
change onto the limited policymaking agenda of cognitively constrained political actors facing
multiple demands for legislative action (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Kingdon, 1984), they
attempt to enlist the support of a broad range of interest groups that together are capable of
capturing policymakers’ attention (Baumgartner, 2002; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002;

7

William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589

Denzau and Munger, 1986). These groups include other organized interest groups and diffuse,
unorganized groups, whose members are either marginally affected or unaffected by the
emergent institution, hereafter referred to as secondary groups.
In order to mobilize such groups, the organized interest groups seeking change attempt to
influence the secondary groups’ normative evaluation of the emergent institution. The secondary
groups typically have not yet evaluated the emergent institutions themselves: the costs of doing
so are high because an emergent institution’s structures, processes and consequences are
unknown and complex, and typically fail to justify the individual benefits of purposive
evaluation available to cognitively limited members of diffuse groups (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler,
1971) or organized groups with their own focal issue.
A primary strategy used by the organized interest groups seeking change is thus to exploit
this perceptual vacuum by attempting to “frame” (Benford and Snow, 2000) the emergent
institution as conflicting with pre-existing “cultural preoccupations and political biases”
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988: 63; McFarland, 1991) in order to demonstrate its illegitimacy and
thereby enfranchise the unaffected groups. The specific means by which they do so is to draw
comparisons between the observable outcomes produced by the allegedly illegitimate emergent
institution and those of established institutions whose legitimacy is not in question. Shocks or
changes in circumstance and investors’ own business practices may facilitate these efforts by
producing distributional outcomes that the groups seeking change may portray as morally
suspect and therefore as additional evidence of the emergent institution’s illegitimacy.
Upper-level political institutions that create checks and balances in the policymaking
process as well as specific characteristics of the investing organizations themselves may both
moderate pressures for change. In countries where formal political structures include multiple
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checks and balances, change in an emergent institution can occur only when there exists
agreement among multiple political actors representing non-overlapping interests. Systems
characterized by greater formal checks and balances and heterogeneity of interest group
pressures promote a status quo bias in policy that raises the threshold level of pressure any one
interest group must be able to exert in order to effect change in an emergent institution (Tiller
and Spiller, 1999; Tsebelis, 2003). Moreover, even when such change does result from the
formal policymaking process, investors may still be able to isolate themselves from its effects by
lobbying pivotal political actors. Their efforts are more likely to be successful when they have
negotiated ex ante an emergent institution that balances long-run profitability with legitimacy
(Williamson, 1985, 1996) or possess distinctive knowledge of and capabilities to influence the
policymaking process in the host country (Barney, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Peteraf, 1993;
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984).
In the discussion that follows, we elaborate on these ideas to build toward a model of
change in emergent institutions. Figure 1 summarizes the model. An emergent institution’s lack
of a cognitive or moral basis for legitimacy and dearth of vested interests render it susceptible to
efforts to overturn, modify or reinterpret it. Organized interest groups that perceive the emergent
institution to inflict substantial distributional losses on them exploit this susceptibility by
publicly questioning the emergent institution’s moral basis for legitimacy. They do so by
creating interpretive frames for the broader polity and publicizing outcomes or other attributes of
the emergent institution that appear to be inconsistent with those of established institutions
representing prevailing notions of legitimacy. Exogenous shocks and investor business practices
may provide additional fodder for these efforts. Political actors are more likely to respond to
pressure for change if the supporting coalition is broad enough. However, formal political
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structures that create checks and balances, as well as organizational linkages and distinctive
knowledge, may reduce political actors’ sensitivity to such pressure.
Illustration of Electricity Generation
We illustrate our arguments with detailed evidence on the experience of foreign investors
in electricity generation as well as examples drawn from other sectors. Private investment in
electricity generation is an apt focal setting for illustrating our propositions because it is
characterized by substantial conflict between the interests of political actors and investors as a
result of large up-front capital costs, a long payback period, and susceptibility to claims of
monopoly abuses (Levy and Spiller, 1994). However, because electricity generation represents
what is perhaps an extreme case, we also provide several examples from industries that differ
from electricity generation on at least one of these dimensions.
For much of the 20th century, virtually every country embraced a norm of government
ownership of electricity systems through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which provided
political actors with a means of pursuing specific distributional objectives. SOEs’ construction of
“white elephants”—large projects with questionable economic justification—promoted both
equal access to electricity (Soto, 1999) and full employment (Savedoff and Spiller, 1999; World
Bank, 1995). Retail pricing schedules further served to subsidize politically powerful classes of
consumers, and nominal price freezes during inflationary periods mitigated the regressive effects
of high inflation (Baer and McDonald, 1998; Bastos and Abdala, 1993; Soto, 1999). Similarly
mixed public and private objectives influenced managers at state-owned enterprises in other
sectors as well (Bertero and Rondi, 2000; Bourbakri and Cosset, 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta,
1997; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh, 1994;
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1998; Vining and Boardman, 1989; Willig, 1994).
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By 1990, the system of public ownership in many developing country markets had begun
to collapse under its own weight, threatening macroeconomic stability and growth. Years of
revenue shortfalls and cost overruns had forestalled economically necessary new construction
and led to poor maintenance of existing facilities (International Energy Agency, 1999). In
addition, fuel price increases, the collapse of the communist bloc, and unprecedented demand
growth from the so-called East Asian miracle had combined to create a need for over $100
billion of new capacity, bringing the pattern of decline to a head. The ultimate result was sharply
reduced service reliability, and in some cases an outright power crisis including voltage
reductions, usage restrictions, brownouts and blackouts. Governments thus turned to
privatization in large part because they did not possess the capital to solve their mounting
problems within the existing system of government ownership (Bortolotti, Fantini, and
Siniscalco, 2000). A growing belief in privatization among international policy elites further
bolstered the trend, particularly in industrialized nations (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
The potential for emergent institutions to be perceived as illegitimate under these
circumstances was acute. The very notion of private infrastructure ownership itself—regardless
of the specific emergent institutions—often conflicted with longstanding norms. Even though
many citizens and organized interest groups in countries suffering from power shortages likely
embraced the notion of reform in general, virtually all had spent their lives in a world where
government ownership of critical infrastructure was a rarely questioned fact; they not only
accepted but expected the politicized pricing, output and sourcing decisions associated with
government ownership. Indeed, political actors—with the assistance of multilateral agencies,
international financial institutions and international investors—in many cases mounted public
relations campaigns to convince citizens of the need to shift from government to private
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ownership in the first place. At a minimum, then, the emergent institutions of private ownership
did not possess a ready basis for attaining morally-based legitimacy at the time of transition; the
possibility of change created heightened political risk for foreign investors.
BACKROUND INFLUENCES
The traditional bargaining power model posits that an initial bargain struck between the
government and foreign investors becomes less resistant to change as investor bargaining power
declines over time. In contrast, our analysis suggests that it is the very youth of the emergent
institution embodying such a bargain that renders it especially susceptible to change.
Lack of Legitimacy
The defining characteristic of an emergent institution—and its main point of contrast with
an established institution—is its lack of widespread, implicit acceptance. Established institutions
have been “retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization” (Berger and Luckman,
1967: 60-61) and consequently possess “a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the
individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Once they enter their
mature phase, established institutions “do not just constrain options: they establish the very
criteria by which people discover their preferences” (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 11).
Actors in a society do not even attempt to evaluate an established institution that is
subject to this level of taken-for-grantedness; the institution is legitimate by assumption. Studies
undertaken in such varied contexts as the adoption of civil service reform by U.S. cities (Tolbert
and Zucker, 1983), the spread of the multidivisional form among large firms (Fligstein, 1985)
and the diffusion of total quality management among hospitals (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell,
1997) all provide evidence that a presumption of legitimacy can trump “cost-benefit”
calculations. Indeed, “taken-for-grantedness represents the most subtle and the most powerful
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source of legitimacy identified to date” (Suchman, 1995: 583). Legitimacy imbues an established
institution with high resistance to change (Zucker, 1977); its very “essence” is one of
“permanence” (Suchman, 1995: 584).
An emergent institution is incapable of attaining legitimacy on such cognitive grounds
(Suchman, 1995: 582) because the conferring social process of is a lengthy one. However, actors
in society may still make a “positive normative evaluation” of an emergent institution’s
consequences, procedures or structural type (Suchman, 1995: 579-81). Such an evaluation
provides a “moral” basis for legitimacy; once made, it too provides the basis for a “generalized
perception or assumption” supporting the propriety of the emergent institution’s conduct, which
in turn reduces the emergent institution’s susceptibility to attack by those opposed to it.
Given the availability of a moral basis for legitimacy, political actors seeking to maintain
future support presumably face an incentive to design emergent institutions that invite a positive
normative evaluation, for example, through isomorphism with established institutions whose
legitimacy is taken for granted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Faced with a pressing economic or
social need that threatens their short-term survival, however, political actors may discount the
future heavily and instead seek the most expeditious solution without regard for its sustainability.
Their cognitive limitations (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), expectation that they will no longer be
in power when distributional consequences come to light (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Bornefalk,
1998; Landes and Posner, 1975; Olson, 1993) or perception that they may have subsequent
opportunities to modify the emergent institution (North and Weingast, 1989) may all contribute
to political actors’ heavy discounting. Organized interest groups’ increased willingness to defer
(Williamson, 1993) or compromise when the costs of delayed resolution is high (Alesina and
Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli, 1993)—possibly compounded by their shifting influence
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following a crisis (Nelson, 1990) or their uncertainty about post-crisis outcomes (Fernandez and
Rodrik, 1991)—further contribute to the possibility that an emergent institution will not be
designed for the ready attainment of legitimacy on a moral basis.
Dearth of Vested Interests
An established institution enjoys the support of interest groups that benefit from it and
fight for its survival. While emergent institutions also initially benefit from the support of certain
interest groups, these groups may not be as numerous, well established, prestigious or rich in
resources as are those with an interest in the status quo. For example, Jaffee and Freeman (2002)
document a case in which established, prestigious law firms in Germany blocked an initiative to
introduce employee stock plans that had the support of newer venture capital firms and the
rapidly growing high technology sector, both of which would have gained business and status
from passage of the initiative. More generally, the most vigorous defenders of an emergent
institution may well be foreign investors themselves, who have no direct voice in the electoral
process and are susceptible to nationalist rhetoric (Kobrin, 1987) that casts doubt on any claims
of legitimacy that they might make.
As an emergent institution matures, new groups of entrepreneurial actors devise means
through which to benefit from it and therefore “fight any attempt to reverse it” (Rodrik, 1994:
82). In Rodrik’s focal context of trade liberalization, for example, “outward-oriented policies
generate new profit opportunities for entrepreneurs… As new, previously unpredictable export
activities appear, a new class of export-oriented businessmen is created” (Rodrik, 1994: 82).
Furthermore, the emergent institution later develops the support of an entrenched bureaucracy,
whose members take actions such as hiring likeminded individuals, mounting campaigns for
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autonomy from political oversight, and providing increased voice for interest groups benefiting
from the emergent institution (Downs, 1966), bolstering its resistance to change.
Proposition
Regardless of the differences in legitimacy and vested interest group support between
emergent and established institutions, both types of entities are always the subject of demands
for change by the organized interest groups that they most adversely affect. In the case of an
emergent institution, these groups may become more vocal once the need that precipitated
construction of the emergent institution is resolved (Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi,
1996). In the context of the policymaking process, however, the primary significance of the
background differences between emergent and established institutions is the greater opportunity
that the organized interest groups seeking change have in the former case to mobilize the support
of secondary groups (Leblebici et al., 1991).
Proposition 1. An emergent institution’s susceptibility to pressures for change is
greatest early in its life and declines with time.
Illustration
A comparison of the treatment received by private investors in the Chilean and Argentine
electricity generation sector illustrates the differential risk that investors face as a result of
differences in legitimacy between established and emergent institutions. Chile was a pioneer in
privatizing its electricity sector during the Pinochet regime starting in the mid-1970s (Estache
and Rodrigues-Pardina, 1998; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Philippi, 1991; Spiller and Martorell,
1996). Although the market principles underlying the reforms originally engendered some public
discord, debate eventually shifted away from core principles to focus on the regulatory apparatus
itself. During the subsequent 30 years, members of Chilean society were socialized under the
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declared principle that “the state should only assume direct responsibility for those functions
which the [people] … are unable to deal with adequately” (Edwards and Edwards, 1991:93) and
witnessed multiple sector-level reforms that increased the legitimacy of market principles. As a
result of its strong public support, the Chilean system has been fairly robust to change, and for
most of its history prices have “moved almost independently of politics” (Spiller and Martorell,
1996:119-21), with one notable exception following a 100-year drought in 1998.
Like the Chilean system, the Argentine system adopted in 1992 was part of a broad
reform package intended to reshape the economy in accordance with more market-oriented
principles; in fact, it is reputed to have been modeled largely after the Chilean system (Lalor and
Garcia, 1996). Both share at their core a mathematical, apolitical formula to set prices. Some
observers thus initially believed that Argentina’s system would function similarly to the Chilean
one, characterizing the electricity market as “relatively unregulated where producers can charge
what the market will bear” (Green, McWilliams, and Pearson, 1995). However, within several
years of the system’s introduction, the Argentine government engaged in heavy-handed political
intervention (Bastos and Abdala, 1993; Estache and Rodrigues-Pardina, 1998). Part of the public
sentiment underlying this response was the “general sense of injustice” (Lapper, 2002) that
Argentineans feel toward many government-sponsored reforms, which they believe “do not
reflect society’s point of view” [Ibid.]. The Argentine system has thus increasingly shifted away
from “merit” dispatch under which generators choose whether or not to produce based on the
government’s offer price to “forced” dispatch under which generators are obligated to produce.
More generally, investors in Chile have greater confidence that policies of deregulation,
liberalization and market-oriented reform will succeed as a result of their attainment of
legitimacy, in contrast to their counterparts in other Latin American countries. The lessons that
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Starr (2002) draws regarding competition policy in much of Latin America are apposite:
competition policy reform “takes years to develop. Much time is required to build institution—to
win legislative support for autonomous and well-funded competition agencies, to train staff, to
change entrenched behavioral patterns in established agencies, and then to modernize the
judiciary and build public support… Simply put, competition policy runs counter to decades of
accepted behaviors” (Starr, 2002).
MECHANISMS OF CHANGE IN EMERGENT INSTITUTIONS
While emergent institutions are relatively susceptible to change, change actually occurs
only through the efforts of “change agents,” in this case, organized interest groups that are
dissatisfied with the distributional outcomes that an emergent institution inflicts on them
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Sjöstrand, 1995). An
important challenge that such groups typically face is the mobilization of a broad enough
coalition to move the issue of change onto the limited policymaking agenda (Baumgartner, 2002;
Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002; Denzau and Munger, 1986; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988;
Kingdon, 1984). The pivotal role of such a coalition underscores the multilateral nature of the
investor’s bargain; this stands in contrast to the traditional bargaining power perspective, which
treats the investor’s bargain as a strictly bilateral one with “the government.” The organized
interest groups seeking change exploit potential coalition members’ agnosticism about the
emergent institution by offering evidence that supports a negative normative assessment, which
provides a moral basis for a judgment of illegitimacy.
Framing and Reference Points
One mechanism that the organized interest groups seeking change use to mobilize
unaffected groups is a “collective action frame” (Benford and Snow, 2000) that facilitates
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negative interpretation of this new and largely unknown entity according to pre-existing beliefs
and biases, for example, the “right” of citizens to control their country’s critical resources or
their “entitlement” to certain services. Research in social movement theory has examined the use
of such frames in varied contexts, for example, national competitiveness frames used by interest
groups seeking to influence standards for high definition television (Dowell, Swaminathan, and
Wade, 2002) and environmental justice frames in recycling policy (Lounsbury, Ventresca, and
Hirsch, 2003).
A complementary mechanism for demonstrating an emergent institution’s illegitimacy is
to contrast its attributes with those of various reference points that reflect a prevailing standard of
legitimacy (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982). Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986)
advance this notion in the context of consumer and labor market transactions between
individuals and private firms. They provide empirical evidence that individuals assess the
“fairness” of the prices or wages set by a firm with which they have not previously transacted by
comparing them to a prevailing price or wage level—a “reference transaction”—whose fairness
is not itself in question. In the social movement context, Minkoff (1997) effectively argues that
the civil rights movement served as reference point for the feminist movement.
Zajac (1995) develops this insight in a political-economic context, focusing especially on
US utility regulation. He contends that a normative principle of fairness requiring “like treatment
of like cases” is “deeply ingrained” in many (“perhaps most”) societies. Furthermore,
“institutional framing”—whereby “the economic environment, operative institutions and
history… give specific meaning…” to the fairness principle—determines “how and under what
circumstances [this principle] will be applied” (Zajac, 1995).3
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The most compelling comparisons that disaffected interest groups draw in their coalitionbuilding efforts may be between their own or other groups’ pre- and post-reform income, as well
as between their own or other groups’ post-reform income and that of foreign investors. The
larger the discrepancies that such comparisons reveal, the greater is the prospect that organized
interest groups will be able to convince others of the emergent institution’s lack of legitimacy.
More generally, an emergent institution in one sector whose consequences, procedures or
structural type are different from those of institutions governing other sectors, or that is adopted
in isolation rather than as part of a broader “package” of linked, consistent reforms, is more
susceptible to change than is an emergent institution that resembles established institutions or is
adopted as part of a broader package of reforms. Furthermore, whereas emergent institutions
adopted as part of a package are relatively difficult to unravel politically (Martinelli and
Tommasi, 1997; Tollison and Willett, 1979), the singular nature of an emergent institution
adopted in isolation—in response to a sector level crisis, for example—provides organized
interest groups with a ready “prognostic frame” for solving the problem of illegitimacy: the
elimination of the offending entity itself.
Proposition 2a. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an
emergent institution grows with the degree of divergence between the emergent
institution and reference points whose legitimacy is not in question.
The crisis conditions under which electricity privatization occurred in many countries set
the stage for institutional design efforts that were inconsistent with observable reference points
and provided a ripe basis for invoking various frames challenging the existence of emergent
institutions. A case in point is the policy that some governments adopted of offering bilateral
“power purchase agreements” (PPAs) that granted highly favorable terms to private investors,
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typically in the absence of broader market rules. These contracts were unique in that private
investors bore practically no risk (other than penalties for failing to begin operations by a
specified date and the operating risk itself) but retained all of the upside potential.
An alternative emergent institution that provided for greater legitimacy in some cases was
a set of sector-level market rules. These rules benefited investors by explicitly limiting the scope
of government intervention. However, by mirroring the structure of other markets in the
economy, they reduced the ability of interest groups of political entrepreneurs to cast them as
special deals deserving of reevaluation.
Evidence that managers recognize the importance of consistency comes from the
microprocessor industry, which is characterized by substantial capital costs but less political
salience than electricity generation is. In its negotiations with various governments during the
site selection process for a $500m semiconductor plant that was eventually located in Costa Rica,
Intel stressed that any concessions that it secured should be generally available to all firms
making an investment of equal size, lest it be singled out as a recipient of special treatment and
made the target of a populist backlash. Concessions to work around legal requirements for
unionization actually eliminated Mexico from the running. Costa Rica, in contrast, altered its
original proposal to comply with Intel’s demand for consistency (Spar, 1998).
Exogenous Changes in Circumstance and Change in Emergent Institutions
In addition to exploiting existing reference points, organized interest groups seeking to
change an emergent institution may also take advantage of exogenous shocks or changes in
circumstance that increase the magnitude, scope or salience of the emergent institution’s
distributional consequences (March and Simon, 1958). Such “focusing events” (Kingdon, 1984:
106) often provide powerful images that constitute perhaps the most striking reference points of
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all. Organized interest groups seeking change may use these events to enfranchise groups that
did not previously regard change in the emergent institution as a salient political issue (Hoffman,
1999; Seo and Creed, 2002), and also to enhance the cohesion of their coalition by constructing
an injustice frame (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982) based on the contrast between the losses
incurred by “victims” and the relative well-being of investors insulated by the emergent
institution. They may further bolster the perception of injustice by pointing to the relative lack of
public debate about the design of the emergent institution at the time of the threat or crisis that
precipitated it (Kogut and Spicer, 2002; Mlcoch, 1998).
Other actors may assist organized interest groups in their campaign for change following
an exogenous shock or change in circumstance. “Political entrepreneurs” including incumbent
politicians, opposition politicians and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may exploit the
event in order to boost their own popular support (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Jones, 1978;
Schneider and Teske, 1992), especially during elections or other periods of political contention.
McFarland’s cyclical theory of interest group politics (1991) as well as the broader
macroeconomic literature on political business cycles, which emphasizes how political actors
may opportunistically manipulate policy levers under their control for the purpose of electoral
gain (Alesina, 1989; Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), are both illustrative. Media
organizations with their own political agendas may play a role as well, especially in
enfranchising diffuse, previously unorganized groups (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Weingast, 1981).
Moreover, “new” groups whose members control inputs whose scarcity has increased following
a disruptive event (Landes, 1998; North, 1990), or are better able to process and exploit new
information than are the members of groups whose routines are adapted to prior circumstances
(Ingram, 1998), may also join the coalition supporting change. At the same time, members of the
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original coalition supporting the emergent institution are more likely to defer or compromise if
the cost of delayed resolution is high and change in the emergent institution—including its
elimination—appears to be an expedient solution (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli,
1993; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1993).
The presence of contrasting reference points, entrepreneurial political actors who seize
upon them and newly enfranchised interest groups all significantly improve the ability of
organized interest groups seeking change in an emergent institution to obtain such change.
Indeed, the conditions that an exogenous shock or change in circumstance creates may play the
pivotal role in determining whether such a group is able to secure major (or punctuated) change
rather than incremental (or creeping) change, which is more common in the policymaking arena
(Astley, 1985; Jones, Baumgartner, and True, 1998; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).
Proposition 2b. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an
emergent institution is higher after an exogenous shock or change in circumstance.
One prominent example of an exogenous shock is a macroeconomic crisis. Argentina
again provides an example: after the 2001-02 financial crisis there, President Duhalde, clearly
attempting to bolster political support for himself, cited the extraordinary profits earned by
foreign infrastructure investors as justification for the imposition of a retroactive emergency
profits tax (Esterl, 2002). The 1997 East Asian financial crisis provides another example.
Citizens and interest groups in these countries, which were already experiencing social and
political strife as a result of the severe economic downturn, perceived PPAs that obligated cashstrapped government entities to pay private generators for unneeded electricity as illegitimate.
Street demonstrations, riots and even, in the case of Indonesia, the revolution that overthrew
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President Suharto were a direct or indirect reaction—often instigated by political
entrepreneurs—to government attempts to honor the terms of PPAs.
Electricity investors have not been alone in facing pressure for change in the emergent
institutions that govern their relationship with the host government. Investors in the
telecommunications, automotive, natural resource and financial sectors have also suffered similar
calls to “share the pain” during the recent Argentine crisis and the ongoing economic turmoil in
Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru.
Investor Business Practices and Change in Emergent Institutions
The foregoing propositions suggest that in addition to the traditional bargaining power
model’s emphasis on the ex ante conditions under which a bargain is struck, the play of the ex
post execution phase is a critical determinant of the level of political risk that an investor faces.
Not only do the specific attributes and outcomes of the emergent institution influence the
perception of legitimacy during this phase, but so too may the behavior of investors.
All foreign investors’ business practices are subject to public scrutiny. Decisions to lay
workers off, or otherwise increase profits at the expense of suppliers, consumers or the
government are easily identified and taken out of context; in some cases, they provide images as
dramatic as those that major shocks and crises do (Guillén, 2000). Organized interest groups
seeking change may tie such factors to injustice frames that they have developed to mobilize
support. For example, in order to reinforce local stereotypes regarding neocolonial exploitation
by private interests, such groups may point to business practices that transfer rents from local
interests to foreign shareholders. Even when such actions are “efficient” or in the long-term
interest of the host country, they may still facilitate the formation of injustice frames.
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Consider some of the specific practices that the traditional bargaining power literature
recommends to protect infrastructure investors from political risk (Moran, 2000; Wells and
Gleason, 1995). One such practice is the substitution of debt for equity, which reduces an
investor’s financial exposure. However, this practice also raises a project’s rate of return, which
can be framed as prima facie evidence of inequity. Similarly, the front-loading of risk through
high “required” returns in the early years of a project’s operation may increase the probability
that investors will recoup their investment, but may also produce higher service prices that can
be labeled as “exploitative.” Other practices include the use of foreign partners to spread risk,
which may feed the perception that a project is not “local” enough; and the use of government
guarantees or commitments to pursue international arbitration, which may be characterized as
“special treatment.” More routine practices such as laying off excess labor or soliciting
competitive bids from foreign as well as local input suppliers also make effective targets.
Proposition 2c. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an
emergent institution is higher when investors undertake new business practices that raise
the project’s rate of return at the expense of powerful local interest groups.
One example of nominally routine business practices’ generating pressure for change
comes from Brazil. Support for the privatization program there waned substantially after a
blackout in Sao Paulo during the Christmas holiday in 1997. Record heat and a poor preprivatization maintenance history were certainly contributing factors, but the press and the public
focused largely on the 40 percent reduction in personnel (some of whom had to be rehired to
teach existing workers how to repair jury-rigged transformers), as well as the utility’s record
profits and weak regulatory supervision (Moffett, 1998). In Buenos Aires, customers who had
been without power for almost a week of high temperatures following a fire at a power station
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operated by the Chilean firm Edesur marched in the streets nightly banging pots and pans and
setting tires and an automobile on fire (Zadunaisky, 1999). An engineer interviewed by the news
media claimed that the delay in reinstating power was caused by Edesur’s laying off of
thousands of skilled Argentine workers like himself (Valente, 1999).
Even business practices that foreign investors undertake to enhance the strength of the
interest group coalition favoring the emergent institutions may later create pressure for change
following an exogenous change in circumstances. Investors in Malaysia and Indonesia, for
example, took on host country partners with privileged political access, as recommended by the
traditional bargaining power literature. This practice does not appear to redistribute returns away
from local interests in any way; in fact, it might well be perceived as “spreading the wealth”
from a successful project. Following the 1997 financial crisis, however, electricity investors in
Indonesia, where the pre-crisis Suharto government had fallen, were labeled as corrupt on the
basis of their ties to the government. In contrast, those who were closely linked through local
partners to the surviving Matathir government in Malaysia benefited from their ties.
Another example from a capital-intensive but less politically salient sector involves the
airport construction and services industry, where Fraport recently wrote off its investment in the
new terminal at Manila airport. The German company formed an equity partnership with a
prominent local Chinese family and allegedly made substantial payments to cronies of former
President Estrada. However, his successor, President Arroyo, made rooting out corrupt dealings
the touchstone of her administration. After challenging 28 specific terms of the contract, she
declared the contract null and void, leaving Fraport with a loss of $318m (Landler, 2003).
INSTITUTIONAL MODERATORS
As discussed in the previous section, the magnitude and scope of interest group pressures
for change in emergent institutions must attain some “threshold” level in order for such change
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to appear on the policymaking agenda because political actors are a capable of considering a
limited number of issues at any one time. Given this limitation, political actors choose issues to
address based not only on the political benefits that they will enjoy from “solving” an issue
through policymaking, but also the “cost” that they must incur in terms of the time and effort that
such policymaking requires. This cost depends largely on the configuration of the country-level
institutions—most prominently the internal structures of and relationships among the legislature,
the executive branch, the judiciary and regulatory agencies—that govern the policymaking
process itself (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Moe and Caldwell, 1994). Configurations
that increase costs impede change, effectively mitigating interest group pressures for change
(Tiller and Spiller, 1999; Tsebelis, 2003), while structures that reduce costs facilitate change,
effectively increasing the potency of such pressures. The neoinstitutional perspective thus
augments the traditional bargaining power model’s list of country-level determinants of
“renegotiation” by incorporating the institutional configuration of policymaking as a determinant
of the “threshold” level of interest group pressure needed to generate change in emergent
institutions.
Analysis of the effects of country-level institutional configurations on the incidence of
policy change derives from the regulative pillar of neoinstitutional theory, including
contributions from economic history (North, 1990; North and Weingast, 1989); formal political
economy models (Dixit, 1996; Laffont, 1999); and qualitative evidence from recent policy shifts
in infrastructure sectors (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Spiller, 1993) and elsewhere (Gely and Spiller,
1990; Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast, 1989; McNollGast, 1987; Weingast and Moran, 1983).
Such institutions are usefully characterized in terms of checks and balances, including both de
jure characteristics such as constitutional separation of powers as well as de facto characteristics
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such as the extent of partisan heterogeneity within and across branches of government.
Institutional configurations with stronger checks and balances require agreement across a
broader range of political actors to effect a shift in policy, increasing the effort required of any
given political actor to change an emergent institution. In contrast, configurations that
concentrate political power in the hands of a single actor facilitate. Empirical evidence
demonstrates the effects of institutional veto points on policy stability (Franzese Jr., 1999;
Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Treisman, 2000b).
For investors assessing the institutional configuration governing the policymaking
process in a given country, recognition of the interplay among different governmental bodies is
particularly important. For example, a veto point that constrains executive discretion on a
constitutional basis, such as an independent legislature, may be entirely controlled by the
executive’s party (Henisz, 2000), effectively negating the constitutional separation of powers.
MacIntyre (2001) provides illustrative evidence from Malaysia at the time of the 1997 Southeast
Asian Financial Crisis: the Parliament there appeared to have a fragmented party structure which
would have impeded a rapid response, but in fact the government party controlled many of the
ostensibly independent parties, generating a homogeneous preference structure and facilitating a
rapid set of changes. Even when partisan preferences in a legislative chamber are truly
heterogeneous, the collective nature of the body may well mean that partisan checks and
balances are less effective than are those provided by freestanding institutional actors such as
regulatory agencies or judiciaries (Crepaz, 1998; 2002). Even these latter sorts of checks and
balances must be scrutinized, however. For example, a regulatory agency or sub-federal entity
that is not monitored or constrained by other governmental bodies is prone to corruption and
overspending (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000; de Mello Jr., 2000; Rodden, 2002; Treisman,
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2000a; Wibbels, 2000) and likely to be more susceptible to interest group pressures for
“reinterpretation” of an emergent institution.
Proposition 3. Given some level of interest group pressure for change, the stronger the
effective checks and balances in the policymaking process, the lower the probability that
political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an emergent institution.
An example of the effect of country-level institutional veto points on change in emergent
institutions is the differential government treatment of private electricity investors in Thailand
and the Philippines relative to that of investors in Indonesia and Malaysia following the 1997
financial crisis. At the time of the crisis, the Parliamentary majority in the Thai legislature was
divided among 10 parties and the Philippine government faced a razor-thin legislative majority
that relied on the support of independents and other allies in both chambers. This
fractionalization of preferences ensured that any new policy proposal or change in the status quo
policy required the approval of multiple parties with their own competing interests.
The country-level institutions in Malaysia and Indonesia looked quite different. Dr.
Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time of the crisis, and President Suharto of
Indonesia effectively controlled the political systems of their respective countries using the
overwhelming majority of National Front Coalition in the former case and the Golkar Party in
the latter. In neither country was the judiciary considered independent.
Investors in Thailand and the Philippines, with their stronger institutional safeguards,
fared relatively well following the crisis. The Thai government absorbed some of the exchange
rate risk held by investors and the Philippine government upheld private investors’ PPAs despite
the fact that this policy adversely affected the state-owned electricity company NAPOCOR.
Electricity investors in Malaysia and Indonesia experienced much less favorable treatment once
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the financial crisis began. In 1997, the Malaysian government announced the suspension of its
largest IPP contract (the 2,400 Bakun hydroelectric project) and demanded substantial
concessions from the remaining IPPs (Global Power Report, 1998). In Indonesia, the government
announced in September 1997 that it would postpone or review infrastructure projects worth a
total of more than 50 trillion rupiah (US $6 billion) and six months later sent a letter to its IPPs
informing them that subsequent compensation would be less than one-quarter of the contracted
rate (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998).
As the burgeoning literature on veto players summarized on pp. 26-28 also suggests, not
all federal systems include both the power of the states to check the center and the power of the
center to constrain the states. Instead, states or provinces often exist as sources of unchecked
political power. Brazil provides an example in the form of a dispute between Itamar Franco, the
former President of Brazil and newly-elected provincial governor of Minas Gerais; and Southern
Corporation and AES, which together purchased the local utility CEMIG in 1997. The inability
of the national government to check the arbitrary, populist actions of Franco in a dispute
regarding the corporate governance of CEMIG was a primary factor in the decision by Duke and
AES to suspend their participation in an auction for the state utility Cesp Tiete later that year.
Another country-level institutional relationship that moderates the behavior of political
actors is the relationship between the regulator and the upper branches of government, in
particular, the extent to which a regulator is able to check the behavior of political actors in these
branches and vice-versa. Where the regulatory authority lacks autonomy, it cannot serve as an
effective check on policymakers motivated to promote unfavorable policies toward investors.
The Hungarian experience is a case in point. Numerous design features limit the Hungarian
Energy Office’s (HEO) independence (Newbery, 1998; Stern, 2000). Incidents such as a
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ministry-mandated reduction in the real price of electricity during the run-up to the 2002
election—in opposition to the HEO’s recommendation—illustrate the fragility of emergent
institutions in the absence of sufficient checks and balances.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
To what extent do individual organizations differ in the level of political risk that they
face? The traditional bargaining power perspective links an organization’s size, export potential
and technology to the rate at which its bargaining power declines, and thus the likelihood that it
will be subject to adverse treatment by the government (Kobrin, 1987). In contrast to this
“invariably passive and conforming” (Oliver, 1991: 146) depiction, in which the organization
simply “responds” to the government’s altered demands, neoinstitutional theories suggest
mechanisms through which organizations may exploit their distinctive institutional traits ex post
to engage in “interest-seeking, active… behavior” [Ibid.] aimed at insulating themselves from
change in emergent institutions. The more active depiction of the organization under this
conception provides a considerably stronger basis on which to build a theory of strategy.
Organizations confronting the risk or reality of adverse change in emergent institutions
confront strong pressures to maintain legitimacy by acquiescing to such change (Oliver,
1991:160-161). Because the enforcement mechanism for emergent institutions is the coercive
power of the state (Scott, 2001: 52), the penalties for noncompliance are both tangible and severe
(Oliver, 1991:168). At the same time, the imposition of a new or modified institution intended to
meet broader distributional demands significantly restricts an organization’s discretion in key
decisions such as “resource allocation, product or service selection, resource acquisition or
organizational administration (i.e., hiring, compensation, promotion)” (Oliver, 1991: 166), and
more generally chafes against the “technical activities and efficiency demands” (Seo and Creed,
2002:226) that support profitability. The prospect of substantial economic loss from conformity
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to the external mandates of the state thus creates strong internal pressures for organizations to
resist change in emergent institutions.
Specific characteristics of an organization affect its ability to resist change. One
characteristic is the organization’s interorganizational linkages. Although these are typically
viewed as determining the diffusion or adoption of new organizational forms (Marsden and
Friedkin, 1993), they are significant in the current context in the degree to which they provide an
organization with channels into the policymaking process. Strong direct or indirect ties to
relevant political actors—especially those who control resources sought by an organization—
permit organizations to craft “side deals” with these actors for special contract terms or
individualized exceptions to adverse changes in emergent institutions. Organizations lacking
such ties are at a distinct disadvantage, not only because they cannot exploit the ties for
defensive purposes during a period of flux, but also because a well-connected competitor’s gain
during a period of upheaval may have a direct adverse impact on them.
A second characteristic is an organization’s information-based resources and capabilities
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Given the difficulty of assessing complex, evolving emergent
institutions, managers who can look to their own past experience for an analogue to guide their
current search for an organizational response or for accumulated learning (Baum and Ingram,
1998; Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000) are better equipped to make sound decisions under conditions
of uncertainty. Henisz and Delios (2001), for example, find that prior experience in a specific
host country reduces an organization’s sensitivity to cultural or market differences. Lyles and
Steensma argue that as a result of the wide diversity of emergent institutions governing
infrastructure projects, investors’ management of their relationship with the government is an
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important organizational capability and key “factor of success” in such projects (Lyles and
Steensma, 1996: 70).
Proposition 4. Given some level of interest group pressure for change, the use of
appropriate organizational linkages and distinctive knowledge lowers the probability
that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an emergent institution
The Czech Republic provides an example of the value of strong direct ties and the
difficulties experienced by organizations that do not themselves possess such ties but whose
competitors do. Oftentimes a “privileged” organization such as a long-standing incumbent, an
SOE or its privatized progeny, or a national champion possesses the strongest ties to relevant
political actors. In the Czech case, the government’s desire to secure a high sale price for CEZ,
the previously state-owned monopoly generator, is widely believed to be responsible for the
promulgation of a new schedule of allegedly inflated prices that independent private generators
must pay to CEZ for “ancillary services” (Financial Times Business Limited, 2000).
Indirect ties that may help moderate the organization-specific impact of change in
emergent institutions include rating agencies, international banking syndicates, equity owners,
government-sponsored political risk underwriters (e.g., OPIC, the Export-Import Bank,
COFACE, ECGD, MITI etc.), multilateral lending agencies (e.g., the Asian Development Bank
and the International Finance Corporation) and home country governments. Investors have
different levels of access to these entities as a result of their size, extent and quality of historical
interactions, past campaign contributions and the like.
A prominent example of the manner in which an organization may employ such indirect
ties in an attempt to alter a policy outcome involves Texas-based Enron Corporation’s
investments in Argentina. A former regulatory official there (now a Congressmen) claims to
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have received a phone call from George W. Bush (the son of then President-elect George H.W.
Bush) that delivered “a subtle, vague message that [helping Enron] could help us with our
relationship to the United States” (Corn, 2002).
Evidence of the value of an organization’s experience profile in moderating adverse
changes in emergent institutions comes from Holburn (2001), who finds evidence suggesting that
organizations that have previously operated under rate-of-return regulation are better equipped to
manage rate review, while organizations with experience in wholesale market competition are
better able to manipulate prices under complex market rules. Similarly, organizations with
experience in countries with centralized political decision-making or multiple checks and
balances respectively enjoy a comparative advantage in other countries with similar attributes.
Examples of firms from other industries whose competitive advantage appears linked to
managing relations with the government abound, particularly in capital-intensive industries or
those characterized by widespread consumption and a strong public interest. The two largest
conglomerates in Hong Kong (Hutchison Whampoa Limited and First Pacific Limited) operate
ports, telecommunication systems, electricity generators, retail chains and hotels in 36 primarily
emerging markets. South Africa’s two largest cellular companies (MTN and Vodacom) offer
service in Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Swaziland, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe. Finally, the two largest Turkish construction firms (ENKA and STFA) manage
projects in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyztan, Libya, Oman, Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan,
and Ukraine. It is doubtful that these firms rely primarily on technological innovation or
marketing ability to drive their internationalization; instead, they have more likely developed the
capability to operate in an idiosyncratic institutional context (Henisz, 2003).
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CONCLUSION
We have sought to augment the traditional bargaining power perspective by considering
the institutional context in which bargains are struck and changed. In contrast to the traditional
perspective’s depiction of bargaining as a one-shot deterministic interaction between an investor
and a monolithic government, our model depicts an ongoing process in the policymaking arena
consisting of interactions among investors, organized interest groups, citizens and political
actors, all of whom face cognitive limitations; differ in their preferences; and are subject to
varying normative pressures, institutional constraints and exogenous influences. Our approach
thus broadens the traditional perspective’s focus on ex ante conditions by building toward a
“recursive, iterative model of institutional change” that combines consideration of “top-down
processes” allowing higher-level structures to shape “the structure and actions of lower-level
actors” with that of “counterprocesses… [allowing] lower-level actors and structures [to] shape
the contexts in which they operate” (Scott, 2001:196-197).
The specific points of distinction between our expanded model and the traditional
perspective are numerous. In our model, the bargain between government and investor assumes
the form of an emergent institution rather than remain devoid of institutional content. A web of
implicit contracts among political actors, interest groups and foreign investors substitutes for the
bilateral dependency between investors and government. Legitimacy augments relative
dependence as a determinant of change. Institutionalization replaces secular decline. Countrylevel institutional structures and organization-level characteristics augment the traditionally
acknowledged determinants of change
Our expanded model also introduces core constructs that have no counterpart in the
traditional perspective. “Events that matter” (Kobrin, 1979)—exogenous changes in
circumstance or specific investor business practices—may be used illuminate misalignment
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between the distributional rights enshrined in a prevailing regulative institution and various
interest groups’ perception of legitimacy. “Environmental processes” (Kobrin, 1979) play a key
role, especially that through which organized interest groups enfranchise secondary interest
groups to exert pressure for change in emergent institutions.
Strategic Implications
The strategic implications of our model for foreign investors are numerous and complex,
sometimes extending those from the traditional bargaining power perspective, sometimes at odds
with them. The first set of recommendations relate to the process of risk assessment. We
highlight the maturity of an emergent institution, its initial design process, its susceptibility to
framing and degree of consistency with existing reference points, and the expected distribution
and nature of environmental disturbances as crucial determinants of political risk. We also point
to the national policymaking structures and an organization’s own internal capabilities as
important determinants of political risk.
In the context of risk management, the traditional perspective advises investors to exploit
their strong initial bargaining power to secure the strongest ex ante safeguards possible, such as
frontloading their returns. Our model suggests that investors exercise caution in exploiting their
initial bargaining power by negotiating for emergent institutions that balance profitability with
legitimacy, and are thus more resistant to interest group pressures for change. Similarly, whereas
the traditional perspective advises investors to take ongoing measures such as protecting
distinctive technology in order to maintain their bargaining power, our model suggests that
investors should exercise caution in their attempts to maintain bargaining power, avoiding
business practices whose actual or perceived distributional consequences may engender
perceptions of illegitimacy of the supporting emergent institutions.
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The recommendation of the traditional bargaining power literature to cultivate local allies
is further enhanced by the legitimacy such partners may provide to emergent institutions when
incentive alignment among the various partners can be maintained. On the other hand, when a
host country partner is well situated to threaten both the economic interests and legitimacy of the
emergent institutions supporting the foreign investor, the partnership strategy may itself be risky.
Routines and capabilities to manage relationships with partners, interest groups and
policymakers all emerge as important success factors.
These findings also have strong implications for insurers and creditors evaluating the
prospects of foreign investors in a host country. By assessing the fitness of an investor’s political
risk mitigation strategy, these financial actors may more accurately determining the proper scope
and price for cover or credit.
Future Research
Substantial work clearly remains. A depiction of an investing organization’s internal
decision-making process similar to the depiction of the policymaking process offered here would
be beneficial, as would a more complete treatment of the differences in decision-making
processes, external linkages and capabilities among investing firms.
We believe that the determinants of the longevity of recent reforms in infrastructure
sectors offer a fruitful starting point for empirical research. The legitimacy of privatization,
deregulation and liberalization in a given country can be proxied for by the level of public-sector
involvement in the economy overall. Measures of government ownership of assets, the
government labor force, and government subsidies and transfers as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product can help to sort among countries for which privately-owned and operated
infrastructure services are likely to be seen as more or less legitimate. We can also readily obtain
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indicators of the time since the initial reform, the subsequent distribution of macroeconomic
shocks, institutional checks and balances, and in some cases relevant external organizational ties.
Additional applications could include the adoption of bilateral investment treaties, commitments
to multilateral organizations, and changes in trade policy.
While our analysis has emphasized the context of foreign investment in host countries
and focused on the legitimacy of distributional outcomes as an impetus for change in emergent
institutions, similar arguments may generalize to other institutional contexts in which legitimacy
derives from other types of outcomes. Quantitative and qualitative studies in a range of contexts
will, we hope, complement each other in the further development of this framework for
understanding change in emergent institutions.
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Figure 1: Change in Emergent Institutions
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